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Note
Balancing the Buyer's Right to Recover for
Precontractual Misstatements and the Seller's
Ability to Disclaim Express Warranties
Elizabeth Cumming
Tom and Carol Petersen needed a silo in which to store
feed for their dairy herd. A sales representative from Feed-
store, Inc. visited them and described the advantages of Feed-
store's "oxygen exclusion" system. The sales representative
showed the Petersens how specially designed "breather bags"
capture the air that enters the silo, keeping oxygen from the
grain. The salesperson's description impressed the Petersens
and they decided to purchase a "Feedstore" silo.1
The Petersens signed a contract containing the following
clauses:2
This order form is the entire and only agreement between the Seller
and the Buyer and no oral statements or agreements not confirmed
herein, or by a subsequent written agreement, shall be binding on
either the Seller or Buyer.
Buyer understands that the sole warranty, express or implied, which
is provided by Feedstore, Inc., is as follows ....
I [BUYER] HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF THIS PURCHASE ORDER, INCLUDING THE
WARRANTIES AND DISCLAIMERS, HEREIN GIVEN TO ME. I
RELY ON NO OTHER PROMISES OR CONDITIONS AND RE-
GARD THAT AS REASONABLE BECAUSE THESE ARE FULLY
ACCEPTABLE TO ME.
The representative failed to explain that air could enter a dome
of empty space under the feed when the silo is unloaded.
Neither the warranty clause nor the remainder of the contract
said anything about the "oxygen exclusion" system or the
"breather bags." After the Petersens began to use the Feed-
1. This hypothetical is based on the facts in D'Huyvetter v. A.O. Smith
Harvestore Prods., 475 N.W.2d 587, 591-92 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
2. The hypothetical contract language was adopted from Keller v. A.O.
Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 819 P.2d 69, 71 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
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store system, their herd's milk production dropped, and a large
number of the herd lost weight. The Petersens sued Feedstore,
Inc., alleging, in the alternative, a contract claim for breach
of express warranty and a tort claim for negligent
misrepresentation.
If the court, examining the contract claim, finds that the
disclaimer clauses in the purchase order were valid, the parol
evidence rule3 will prevent the Petersens from introducing the
representative's precontractual oral statements. A court ruling
on the tort claim could allow the Petersens to recover, if the ju-
risdiction recognizes a tort action for negligent misrepresenta-
tion.4 The court in this instance may find that the sales
representative negligently communicated the precontractual
statements and that the Petersens justifiably relied on them.
Thus, the tort claim could succeed where the contract claim
would fail.
This resolution of the Petersen's suit raises two issues. The
first involves whether a plaintiff should be able to avoid con-
tract law barriers to recovery for precontractual misstatements
by bringing an action in tort.5 Plaintiffs often choose tort law,
with its procedural advantages, 6 in situations involving a defec-
tive product,7 the defective performance of a service contract,8
or a flaw in the contract formation process. This Note consid-
3. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
5. This question focusses on one aspect of what scholars have called a
struggle between tort and contract. A number of commentators have pre-
dicted the "death" of contract and its reabsorbtion into tort law. See, eg.,
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 55-103 (1974) (discussing a number
of common-law developments that illustrate a basic coming together of tort
and contract, e.g., quasi-contract and promnmisory estoppel).
6. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SE-
LECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380, 427-28 (1954).
7. Such suits fall under the general rubric of "products liability." See
generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 95-104A, at 677-724 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
The authors define five categories of losses related to products liability: per-
sonal injury, physical damage to property other than the product, damage to
the product purchased by the first purchaser, damage to a product made or re-
paired with the defendant's components, and intangible economic loss. Id
§ 95, at 678. Tort liability for physical harm to persons and tangible things
other than the defective product may lie either in negligence or strict liability.
Id. §§ 96, 98, at 683-89, 692-94.
8. American courts have extended tort liability for "misfeasance," as this
situation has historically been called, to contracts in which defective perform-
ance may injure the promisee and there would be liability for gratuitous per-
formance without the contract. Id. § 92, at 660-61.
1190 [Vol. 76:1189
TORT VERSUS CONTRACT
ers the last situation, specifically the relationship between the
law of misrepresentation and the law of warranty in the setting
of misrepresentations that do not rise to the level of "fraud."9
In the last decade, courts have taken a number of approaches to
determining whether to maintain a tort action in nonfraudulent
misrepresentation. The case law on this issue is growing and is
becoming increasingly unsettled.
A second question concerns whether, in light of a clause
disclaiming all warranties except those embodied in the con-
tract, a buyer should ever be able to recover for damages
caused by precontractual misstatements. Suits such as the Pe-
tersen's illustrate a growing tension between the perceived
need for extra-contractual, extraordinary policing of contract
formation'0 and the desire to preserve the principle of freedom
of contract."
This Note attempts to balance these competing interests
and suggest a uniform approach. Part I sets forth the basic con-
cepts of warranty and misrepresentation. Part II categorizes
the approaches taken by state and federal courts in reconciling
a nonfraudulent misrepresentation claim and a contractual dis-
claimer of warranties. In Part III, this Note argues that parties
to a sale of goods transaction should not be able to circumvent
contract law by recasting the cause of action in tort. This Note
further contends that those courts maintaining a tort action,
notwithstanding a contract containing a disclaimer clause, have
contradicted the express intent of both the drafters of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC) and the legislatures that
adopted the UCC. Part IV proposes a modification of the law of
sales that would allow courts to police precontractual negotia-
tions without rendering freedom of contract a nullity.
9. This Note does not address the case of fraudulent misrepresentation
in great detail because the relationship between tort and contract with respect
to intentional misstatements is well-settled. See infra note 54. "Fraud," it
should be noted, is an elastic concept that courts have stretched to encompass
many acts of miscommunication. See infra note 42. This Note uses the term
"fraudulent" in its narrowest, most technical sense: intentionally deceptive
statements that the speaker either knew were false or made with reckless dis-
regard of whether they were true.
10. Courts have developed a number of doctrines that regulate the behav-
ior of contracting parties. Among these are fraud, duress, unconscionability,
mistake, and misrepresentation. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-1, at 147
(2d ed. 1980).




I. THE LAW OF EXPRESS WARRANTY AND THE
DOCTRINE OF MISREPRESENTATION
A. EXPRESS WARRANTY
Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code 2 contains
the modem statement of warranty law.13 A warranty is a state-
ment of fact, either articulated or implied by law, respecting
the quality or character of the goods to be sold.14 The UCC dis-
tinguishes between express warranties,15 and implied warran-
12. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was the product of a massive
reform effort that began in the late 1930s, originally sponsored by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. For an overview of the
genesis of the UCC, see William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Prepara-
tion and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1
(1967). Currently, 49 states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands
have adopted one of three different official texts of the UCC. WHrTE & SUM-
MERS, supra note 10, § 1-1, at 5. Louisiana has adopted some articles from the
UCC, but has not yet adopted Article Two. Id.; see also Banque de Depots v.
Ferroligas, 569 So. 2d 40, 43 (La. Ct. App. 1990). However, as part of the state-
by-state enactment process, various jurisdictions have amended the UCC.
Thus, the UCC is not exactly what it claims to be-namely, uniform. Never-
theless, the basic principles embodied in the UCC offer a common foundation
for analyzing transactions that fall within its scope. See W=rTE & SUMMERS,
supra note 10, §§ 1-11, 1-3, at 1-6, 8.
Article Two, concerning contracts for the sale of goods, was drafted princi-
pally by Karl N. Llewellyn and replaced the Uniform Sales Act of 1906.
Charles A. Heckman, "Reliance" or "Common Honesty of Speech" The His-
tory and Interpretation of Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 38
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987). For the first time since its initial publication,
Article Two will undergo a major revision. In 1987, the Permanent Editorial
Board of the Uniform Commercial Code approved the creation of a Study
Group charged with identifying major problems in the operation of Article
Two. Amelia H. Boss, PEB Study Group: Uniform Commercial Code, Article
2 Executive Summary to Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 1991 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, ch. 664, at 475. The Study
Group has unanimously recommended that a Drafting Committee be ap-
pointed to revise Article Two. Id.
13. The law of warranty shares a common ancestry with the law of mis-
representation. Both bodies of law derive from the action on the case, the only
appropriate form of action during the late middle ages for redressing harms
such as the Petersens'. Fitz. Ab. Monst. de Faits, Y.B. 7 Rich. 2, pl. 160 (1383)
(cited in PROSSER, supra note 6, at 384 & n.22). The action of assumpsit later
branched off from the action on the case and became increasingly contractual
in nature, while the action on the case became increasingly tort-like. See 1
FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 1.6. Breaches of warranty first became actiona-
ble through a claim in assumpsit in the late eighteenth century, Stuart v. Wil-
kins, 1 Douglas' Rep. 18 (K.B. 1778), and were completely divorced from
connotations of "tort" in the early 19th century. PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 7, § 105, at 729.
14. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1423 (5th ed. 1979).
15. UCC § 2-313 states:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
1192 [Vol. 76:1189
TORT VERSUS CONTRACT
ties of merchantability 6 and fitness for a particular purpose.17
Regarding express warranties, the declarant need not intend to
make a warranty in order for one to arise.'8 Courts and com-
mentators are divided, however, on whether the buyer must
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the
goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that
the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or
that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an af-
firmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement pur-
porting to be merely the seller's opinion does not create a
warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-313 (1990).
16. UCC § 2-314 provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this
section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either
on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract de-
scription; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among
all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), other implied war-
ranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1990).
17. UCC § 2-315 states:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next
section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (1990).
18. "It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the
seller... have a specific intention to make a warranty .... ." U.C.C. § 2-313(2)
(1990).
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rely on the express warranty for it to be actionable. 19
A suit for a breach of warranty lies whenever the goods do
not conform to the warranty;20 the seller need not be guilty of
"blameworthy" conduct.2 1 The UCC defines damages for the
seller's breach of any of these warranties as the difference be-
tween the value of the goods as received and their value if they
19. Courts and commentators have struggled with the meaning of "basis
of the bargain." See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 9-4, at 333 (noting
that although "basis of the bargain" is an issue that the buyer must plead and
prove, the UCC does not articulate any standard); John E. Murray, Jr., "Basis
of the Bargain" Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN. L. REv. 283, 304
(1982) (characterizing the situation as "mass confusion"). One commentator,
however, has argued compellingly that, based on Llewellyn's academic writ-
ings and his redrafts of the Uniform Sales Act, he clearly intended, by use of
"basis of the bargain" language, to divorce warranty law from a requirement
of reliance. Heckman, supra note 12, at 10-16.
The predecessor of the UCC, the Uniform Sales Act, required a showing
of reliance with respect to affirmations of fact and promises which related to
the goods. UNIF. SALES ACT § 12 (1906). Description, however, was treated as
an implied warranty and therefore did not need a showing of knowledge or re-
liance on the part of the buyer. 1d. § 14. Karl Llewellyn, key architect of Arti-
cle Two of the UCC, approved whole-heartedly of the status of description
under the Uniform Sales Act. Karl N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality
and Society: II, 37 COLUm. L. REv. 341, 384-85 (1937) ("As to description... it
was genius or prophecy that informed the accident by which that main root of
the growth of representation into 'express' warranty was excised and trans-
planted into the orchard of the 'implied.' "). Comment 3 to § 2-313 itself bears
witness to Llewellyn's position:
In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the
goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those
goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown
in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement.
U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (1990); see, e.g., Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d
638, 645 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing cases). In practice, however, a number of
courts still read reliance into a breach of warranty action. Murray, supra, at
283-84.
This Note adopts Llewellyn's conception of the phrase "basis of the bar-
gain" and, when referring to UCC § 2-714, assumes that a showing of reliance
is not required.
20. Contract law also allows one party to rescind or reform the contract if
the other party has misrepresented a material fact, even if that other party
honestly believed that the statement made was true. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CONTRACTS §§ 164, 166 (1977) (rescission and reformation).
21. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 9-1, at 327. White and Sum-
mers distinguish between the requisite mental states for actions in warranty
and fraud. Id. Fraud addresses "blameworthy conduct"-an intentional or
reckless statement of a mistruth. The seller must want to mislead buyer, or at
least must not care. On the other hand, a seller can sincerely believe that the
representations he made were accurate (he "can be Simon pure," in White and
Summers's words) and still be liable for a breach of an express warranty. Id.
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would have been as warranted,22 plus incidental 2s and conse-
quential2 damages where appropriate.
The UCC recognizes that descriptions and affirmations of
fact relating to the goods to be sold often go to the core of the
"dickered" aspects of the bargain.25 Thus, the law of warranty
determines the scope of the seller's obligation to the buyer:
What has the.seller agreed to sell?2 6 The UCC, however, al-
lows the parties to disclaim warranties, express and implied.27
In such a case, the buyer agrees to purchase the goods as they
are described, if they are described, in the sales contract. The
warranty disclaimer is a voluntary reallocation of obligations; it
exemplifies the principle of freedom of contract that underlies
the entire UCC.2s
When a disclaimer of express warranties is part of a final
written contract,29 it falls within the scope of Article Two's pa-
22. (2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the differ-
ence at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as
warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a
different amount.
U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1990). The UCC also allows the parties to limit the remedies
for breach of warranty "in accordance with the provisions of this Article on
liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual modification of remedy
(Sections 2-718 and 2-719)." U.C.C. § 2-316(4) (1990). The ability to limit the
remedies for breach of warranty should not be confused with the ability to dis-
claim warranties. The former restricts the scope of the damages that the
buyer may recover; the latter denies the buyer the right to recover any dam-
ages at all.
23. UCC § 2-715(1) provides an illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of the
buyer's incidental damages as follows:
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation
and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with ef-
fecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay
or other breach.
U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (1990).
24. Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include "in-
jury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of war-
ranty." U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1990).
25. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 1 (1990).
26. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 4 (1990).
27. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1990).
28. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 2 (1990) ("Subsection (3) states affirmatively at the
outset that freedom of contract is a principle of the Code: 'the effect' of its pro-
visions may be varied by 'agreement.' -).
29. (1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express war-
ranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall
be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence
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rol evidence rule.30 The parol evidence rule is a rule of sub-
stantive contract law that prevents a factfinder from
considering extrinsic evidence that would create or alter obliga-
tions under the contract.31 If the parties intend the disclaimer
clause to be the final word with respect to warranties, it cannot
be contradicted. Thus, the parol evidence rule prevents the
buyer from introducing precontractual oral statements when
the contract contains a disclaimer of express warranties.
32
The ability to disclaim warranties, as with all exercises of
freedom of contract, is not absolute. Section 2-316(2) sets forth
requirements of form for disclaimers of implied warranties.33
Furthermore, courts can void all or part of a contract that is
(Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that
such construction is unreasonable.
U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1990). Some states have amended this section to render it
ineffective in contracts for the sale of consumer goods. See ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (West Supp. 1991); MD. COM. LAW I CODE ANN. § 2-
316.1(3) (1975 & Supp. 1991); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316A (West
1990 & Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1991); WASH. REV.
CODE § 62A.2-316(4) (1990).
30. In the context of sale of goods transactions, the parol evidence rule is
stated in § 2-202 of the UCC:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by
the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to
such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evi-
dence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agree-
ment but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by
course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclu-
sive statement of the terms of the agreement.
U.C.C. § 2-202 (1990).
If the parties intended the contract to be the complete and exclusive state-
ment of their agreement, the contract cannot be contradicted, supplemented or
otherwise varied by evidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement or
a prior written agreement. Id
31. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 7.2.
32. But see Carpetland U.S.A. v. Payne, 536 N.E.2d 306, 309 n.1 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1989) (discussed infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text).
33. Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied war-
ranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to
exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must
be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied
warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There
are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face
hereof."
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1990).
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substantively or procedurally "unconscionable."' ' Courts, how-
ever, rarely invalidate disclaimer clauses on procedural or sub-
stantive grounds. 35 Thus, unable to attack the disclaimer clause
in contract, the buyer turns to tort concepts.
B. MISREPRESENTATION
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes three types
of misrepresentation: fraudulent, negligent and innocent.36 All
three torts apply to misrepresentations of material fact,37 and
all three require that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the mis-
statement.38 The Restatement contemplates the recovery of pe-
cuniary losses that are proximately caused by the
misrepresentation. 3 9
34. UCC § 2-302 states the law of unconscionability:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the re-
mainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may
so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be af-
forded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commer-
cial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990).
35. See, e.g., Avery v. Aladdin Prods. Div., Nat'l Serv. Indus., Inc., 196
S.E.2d 357 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973). As one commentator has noted, courts "have
been reluctant to declare unconscionable under the general provisions of sec-
tion 2-302 that which the [UCC] specifically permits." Richard A. Lord, Some
Thoughts About Warranty Law: Erpress and Implied Warranties, 56 N.D. L.
REV. 509, 546 (1980). But see Schmaltz v. Nissen, 431 N.W.2d 657, 662 (S.D.
1988) (holding that the disclaimer of warranties and limitation of damages
clauses in a seed manufacturer's sales contract were unconscionable because
plaintiffs, "like most farmers, were not in a position to bargain for more
favorable contract terms, nor were they able to test the seed before their
purchase").
36. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-549 (1977) (fraudu-
lent misrepresentation) with id, § 552 (negligent misrepresentation) and id,
§ 552C (innocent misrepresentation).
37. A plaintiff may not recover for a fraudulent misrepresentation of
opinion, intention or law, except as they imply misrepresentations of fact. Id.
§§ 542-545. Negligent misrepresentation also may lie for a negligently given
opinion that is based "upon facts equally well known to both the supplier and
the recipient" of the opinion. Id. § 552 cmt. b.
38. Id §§ 537-545A (fraudulent misrepresentation); §§ 552 (negligent mis-
representation), 552A (limiting justifiable reliance with doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence); § 552C (innocent misrepresentation).
39. Id. § 549 (allowing the plaintiff to recover the benefit of the bargain
for fraudulent misrepresentation under certain circumstances); § 552B (limit-
ing plaintiff's recovery to out-of-pocket losses, including consequential dam-
11971992]
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Fraudulent misrepresentation, also called an action in de-
ceit, requires scienter, or the intent to induce a buyer to act or
refrain from acting in reliance on the intentional misstate-
ment.40 Additionally, the defendant must either have known
that the statement was false or have acted with reckless disre-
gard for the truth of the statement.4 ' Scienter implies that the
defendant acted in bad faith.
The development of the scienter requirement excluded
negligently or innocently made misstatements from the action
in deceit.42 Accordingly, in the last seventy-five years, many
jurisdictions have developed seperate actions for negligent and
innocent misrepresentation. The tort of negligent iisrepresen-
tation4 3 imposes on the speaker a duty to exercise the care or
ages, in a suit for negligent misrepresentation); § 552C (further restricting
plaintiff's recovery in an action for innocent misrepresentation to the differ-
ence between the value of what plaintiff parted with and the value of what
plaintiff received).
40. Id. § 526; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 107, at 741-42.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 526-530 (1977). The current for-
mulation of the action for fraudulent misrepresentation originated with the
holding of the House of Lords in Derry v. Peek, 1889 App. Cas. 337 (appeal
taken from Eng.). That decision limited the action in deceit to intentional
misrepresentations, leaving negligence and strict liability to other actions. Id.
at 339. The draftsmen of the first Restatement of Torts noted that the lan-
guage they employed "adopts the effect of the opinion of Lord Herschell" in
Derry v. Peek. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 87 (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1936).
42. If the defendant honestly believed that the statements she made were
true, her conduct falls outside the realm of deceit. Even if her belief was ob-
jectively unreasonable, it does not constitute bad faith. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 7, § 107, at 742. A number of courts devised various formulations
that "stretched" the concept of scienter, allowing recovery for misstatements
made with something less than an intent to deceive. Id. § 107, at 740-42; Leon
Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REv. 749, 752-57 (1930). For example, courts have im-
puted knowledge to the defendant, thereby arriving at the conclusion that the
defendant "knew" of the falsity of the statement. PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 7, § 107, at 742. Courts have also given a broad interpretation to "reck-
lessness" in order to remedy situations that might not, strictly speaking, fall
within the scope of scienter. See, e.g., Flamme v. Wolf Ins. Agency, 476 N.W.2d
802, 809 (Neb. 1991) (Shanahan, J., concurring). Commentators in the 1920s
and 1930s frequently bemoaned these legal fictions. See, e.g., Francis H. Boh-
len, Misrepresentation as Deceit Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARv. L. REv.
733 (1929).
43. Rhode Island is the most recent state to allow the recovery of pecuni-
ary losses resulting from negligent misrepresentation. Estate of Braswell v.
People's Credit Union, No. 90-251-Appeal, 1992 WL 9754, at *6 (R.I. Jan. 21,
1992) (adopting the formulation in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552).
Virginia does not recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation. Haigh v.
Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 676 F. Supp. 1332, 1349-50 (E.D. Va. 1987) (ap-
plying Virginia law). Indiana recognizes negligent misrepresentation only in
the context of employment contracts. Eby v. York-Div., Borg-Warner, 455
1198 [Vol. 76:1189
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competence of a reasonable person communicating informa-
tion.44 The defenses available in negligence actions apply
equally here; for example, a court may scrutinize the plaintiff's
conduct under the doctrine of contributory negligence. 45 A suc-
cessful plaintiff will recover out-of-pocket damages plus any
consequential damages caused by the misstatement.
46
N.E.2d 623, 628-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). A number of states have limited liabil-
ity for negligent misrepresentation to persons in the business of providing in-
formation of the sort relied upon. See Danforth v. Acorn Structures, Inc., No.
90C-JN-30, 1991 WL 269956, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1991); Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 452 (Ill. 1982); Meier v. Alfa-
Laval, Inc., 454 N.W.2d 576, 581-82 (Iowa 1990). Delaware and Illinois further
require that the plaintiff use the information in business transactions involv-
ing a third party. Daforth, 1991 WL 269956, at *2; Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at
452.
Nebraska recognizes negligent misrepresentation in the context of an in-
surance agent's misstatements to an insured. Flamme v. Wolf Ins. Agency, 476
N.W.2d 802, 807 (Neb. 1991). One member of the Flamme court viewed the
opinion as an "innovation" reaching beyond the facts of the case, stating that it
introduces a cause of action that "has never inhabited Nebraska law before
[this] decision." Id. at 808-09 (Shanahan, J., concurring).
44. Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts embodies the doc-
trine of negligent misrepresentation. Negligent misrepresentation began as a
remedy for third parties harmed by the erroneous statements of defendants
who supplied information for the guidance of others in their business transac-
tions. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 70-71, 107 (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1936)
(codifying the rule in Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922)). The ac-
tion remained limited for a number of years, reflecting the courts' concern
that a defendant could be subjected to "liability in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, C.J.).
Section 552 expanded in the second Restatement to include "any other
transaction in which [the defendant] has a pecuniary interest." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). This change in language can be read to in-
clude contractual negotiations between a potential buyer and seller. But see
Alfred Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 679,
685-88 (1973) (questioning whether § 552 applies to "antagonistic" transactions
such as sales contracts). The comments state that "[tihe defendant's pecuniary
interest in supplying the information will normally lie in a consideration...
paid in a transaction in the course of and as a part of which it is supplied."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. d (1977). This language appears
to encompass contracts for the sale of goods.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552A (1977). Some jurisdictions
that have adopted the concept of comparative fault have explicitly not dis-
placed contributory negligence for torts involving pecuniary loss. Kevin
Schnurbusch, Comment, Negligent Misrepresentation in Missouri" Tooling Up
for the Tort of the Eighties, 50 Mo. L. REv. 877, 899-900 (1985) (discussing Mis-
souri law).
46. The action for negligent misrepresentation allows the plaintiff to re-
cover the difference between the value of the goods as received and the
purchase price (or the value of whatever was offered in exchange for the
goods), plus any consequential damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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A handful of jurisdictions recognize an action for innocent
misrepresentation.47 This tort operates on the principle of
strict liability; if the defendant misspoke and harm resulted
from the plaintiff's justifiable reliance on the misstatement, an
action lies.48 As in a breach of warranty suit, the defendant's
"blameworthiness," (i.e., negligence or bad faith) is not relevent
to the plaintiff's right to recover.49 The measure of damages in
an action for innocent misrepresentation, however, is less than
that recoverable in a breach of warranty suit.50
§ 552B (1977). The tort does not consider whether the underlying bargain was
"good" or "bad"; its only concern is the restoration of out-of-pocket losses.
An action to recover for breach of warranty, on the other hand, does take
into account the nature of the bargain. The buyer cannot escape a bad bargain
by claiming breach of warranty. For example, suppose a buyer pays $5000 for
widgets and, at the time of their delivery, they were worth only $1000 because
they did not conform. Had they conformed, however, their fair market value
would have been only $4000. Under UCC § 2-714, the buyer can recover only
the difference between the value of the goods at the time of delivery as ac-
cepted ($1000) and the value at the time of delivery that they would have had
if they were as warranted ($4000). See U.C.C. § 2-714 (1990).
In a breach of warranty action, however, the buyer can recover the benefit
of a good bargain. Suppose the widgets for which buyer paid $5000 were actu-
ally worth $1000 at the time of delivery but, had they conformed, they would
have been worth $6000 at the time of delivery. The buyer can recover the
$1000 benefit, above and beyond the contract price, of which he has been de-
prived because of the non-conformity.
47. At least eight jurisdictions recognize a tort action for innocent misrep-
resentation (strict liability). See ALA. CODE § 6-5-101 (1975); Stein v. Treger,
182 F.2d 696, 698-99 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 763
(Alaska 1982) (finding real estate broker liable for innocent misrepresenta-
tion); D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Dirs., 520 A.2d 217, 223-24 (Conn. 1987); Sham-
baugh v. Lindsay, 445 N.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (discussing
Kansas law); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Black, 313 N.W.2d 77,
82-85 (Mich. 1981); Snell v. Cornehl, 466 P.2d 94, 95 (N.M. 1970); West Side
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hirschfeld, 476 N.Y.S.2d 292, 295 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984); Reda v. Sincaban, 426 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988). "[There is
some doubt whether Iowa recognizes innocent misrepresentation as a separate
tort." Beeck v. Kapalis, 302 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Iowa 1981) (citing cases).
48. (1) One who, in a sale, rental or exchange transaction with an-
other, makes a misrepresentation of a material fact for the purpose of
inducing the other to act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon it,
is subject to liability to the other for pecuniary loss caused to him by
his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though it is
not made fraudulently or negligently.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (1977).
49. See supra note 21.
50. "Under this Section, damages are solely restitutionary in character. In
contrast, the measure of damages for breach of warranty includes compensa-
tion for benefit of the bargain and for consequential losses." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C cmt. b (1977). A restitutionary measure of damages
seeks to return the buyer to the status quo ante, putting him in as good a posi-
tion as he would have been in had no contract been made.
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These three tort actions for misrepresentation attempt to
fulfill the policy underlying all of tort law: the protection of
valued interests. In the context of commercial transactions, the
interest being protected is freedom from economic harm.51 Be-
cause contract law imposes few duties on the parties during the
process of precontractual negotiations,5 2 parties often turn to
the law of misrepresentation to recover pecuniary losses result-
ing from precontractual misstatements.
53
II. THE COURTS' TREATMENT OF NONFRAUDULENT
MISREPRESENTATION VIS-A-VIS
DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTY
Courts adopt a variety of approaches when resolving suits
in which a nonfraudulent misrepresentation claim conflicts
with an aspect of contract law.M Courts explain their decisions
51. See id. § 552 cmt. a; idL § 552C cmt. a.
52. Mark P. Gergen, Liability for Mistake in Contract Formation, 64 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1990). Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code re-
quires the parties to a commercial transaction to act in "good faith"; that sec-
tion is limited, however, to the performance and enforcement of a contract,
not the process of contract formation: U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990). Currently, the
law implies no duty to bargain in good faith, but courts have begun to enforce
express agreements to that effect. Gergen, supra, at 31-32. In any event, a
duty of "good faith" does not address the problem of negligent misrepresenta-
tion because "good faith", in the context of sales transactions, is defined as
"honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1990).
53. Statutes sanctioning deceptive trade practices incorporate concepts of
common-law misrepresentation. The uniform statute states: "A person en-
gages in deceptive trade practice when [that person] .... represents that goods
or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, bene-
fits, or quantities that they do not have .... ." UNIm. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRAC-
TICEs AcT § 2 (1966).
The following states have enacted the 1966 version of the Uniform Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act: Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Mexico, Ohio and Oregon. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AcT tbl.
of jurisdictions (1966). Four states follow the 1964 version: Delaware, Illinois,
Maine and Oklahoma. UNIF. DECEPTVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT tbl. of jurisdic-
tions (1964). The 1964 Act is meant to protect business interests by prohibiting
unfair competition and trademark infringement. I& cmts. to prefatory note.
States enacting the 1966 Act have construed it as primarily protecting consum-
ers. See, e.g., Graham v. Kold Kist Beverage Ice, Inc., 607 P.2d 759, 761 (Or. Ct.
App. 1979). Similarly, Idaho and Texas have enacted Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Acts that are modeled loosely on the 1966 Uniform Act and also empha-
size "consumer" protection. UNIV. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT cmts. to
prefatory note (1966).
54. Courts have little difficulty in reconciling a claim for fraudulent mis-
representation with a conflicting term in a contract. When a buyer sues a
seller for fraudulent precontractual misrepresentations, courts allow the buyer
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to maintain or dismiss tort actions in terms of one or more of
three bases: the applicability of the parol evidence rule or an
integration clause, the existence of a duty of care, and the sig-
nificance of freedom of contract.
First, a court might analyze the problem in terms of the
parol evidence rule or an integration clause.55 Some courts,
concentrating solely on the contract, have concluded that the
alleged misrepresentations are not actionable because either an
integration clause56 or the parol evidence rule5' bars their con-
sideration. These courts reason that to hold otherwise would
open every contract to challenge from parol evidence of poten-
tially dubious merit.58 Thus, the plaintiff, under this analysis,
to choose one of two remedies. The buyer can rescind or reform the contract,
WHITE & SUMMERS, supa note 10, § 2-11, at 88, or the buyer can recover dam-
ages in tort for the seller's intentional misrepresentations. See supra note 39
and accompanying text. In either case, the parol evidence rule will not pre-
vent the buyer from establishing the fraudulent misstatements, despite a dis-
claimer clause in the contract. See Aplications Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
501 F. Supp. 129, 134-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing cases). Fraud that induces a
person to enter into a contract is a well-established exception to the parol evi-
dence rule. See, e.g., Withers v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 567 So. 2d 253, 255
(Ala. 1990); Filmlife, Inc. v. Mal "Z" Ena, Inc., 598 A.2d 1234, 1235 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1991); ROBERT A. HILLMAIN ET AL., COMMON LAw AND EQurTY
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1 3.06[3] (1985).
55. An integration clause, also called a merger clause, is a provision in a
contract that recites that the written terms cannot be varied by prior or oral
agreements because all such agreements have been "integrated" or "merged"
into the written document. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 726 (5th ed. 1979). The
integration clause thus acts as a private parol evidence rule for the contract.
56. Ritchie Enters. v. Honeywell Bull, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1041, 1051 (D.
Kan. 1990) ("The Basic Agreement contains an integration clause stating that
it represents the parties' entire agreement and 'supersedes all prior oral and
written proposals and communications'. "); Rio Grande Jewelers v. Data Gen-
eral Corp., 689 P.2d 1269, 1270 (N.M. 1984) ("ITihe contract ... specifically pro-
vided that it was to be the 'complete and exclusive statement' of the
agreement between the parties."); cf. Stanley v. Miro, 540 A.2d 1123, 1124 (Me.
1988) (holding that the integration clause in a real estate transaction precluded
the purchaser's right to rely on representations made during negotiation of the
contract).
57. Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 619 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1980) (holding that the parol evidence rule barred plaintiff's claims for
negligent misrepresentation because the contract for the sale of computer
equipment specifically excluded the alleged precontractual statements about
the capacity of the system); cf. United States Welding, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.,
640 F. Supp. 350, 352-53 (D. Colo. 1985) (holding that a claim for negligent mis-
representation is invalid when the lease, which disclaims prior representa-
tions, is fully integrated).
58. See, e.g., 21st Century Properties Co. v. Carpenter Insulation and Coat-
ings Co., 694 F. Supp. 148, 154 n.7 (D. Md. 1988); cf. Apple Valley Red-F-Mix
Inc. v. Mills-Winfield Eng'g Sales, Inc., 436 N.W.2d 121, 123-24 (Minn. Ct. App
1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving legal effect to a warranty de
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cannot introduce the facts required to establish an action for
misrepresentation. Other courts, however, have focussed on
the fact that the plaintiff has stated a claim in tort. This group
of courts refuses to apply a substantive rule of contract law, the
parol evidence rule, to a tort action.59 Similarly, when con-
fronted with an integration clause, they are not willing to allow
the seller to escape tort liability with fine print in the
boilerplate.
60
Second, courts have evaluated misrepresentation actions in
terms of whether the seller has a duty of care in obtaining or
communicating information in an arm's length commercial
transaction.61 Two jurisdictions, Maryland and Illinois, have
concluded, albeit on different grounds, that a seller does not
owe the buyer a duty of care. Although Maryland courts have
rejected the proposition that negligent misrepresentation can
scribed in testimony concerning precontractual negotiations when the lease
was fully integrated).
59. Formento v. Encanto Business Park, 744 P.2d 22, 26 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that plaintiff "is entitled to a trial on the merits of the issue of
negligent misrepresentation, and the parol evidence rule cannot be used by
[defendant] as a shield against its own representations"); Keller v. A.O. Smith
Harvestore Prods., Inc., 819 P.2d 69, 73 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) (holding that the
parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive contract law and does not apply to
tort actions); Wilburn v. Stewart, 794 P.2d 1197, 1199 (N.M. 1990) (holding that
"parol evidence is admissible to show any misrepresentations that induced the
parties to contract"); Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 391 S.E.2d 577, 580-81
(S.C. 1990) (following the reasoning in Formento); Stamp v. Honest Abe Log
Homes, Inc., 804 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the parol
evidence rule is inapplicable to plaintiffs' claim for negligent misrepresenta-
tion because the suit did not involve interpretation of the contract).
60. Keller, 819 P.2d at 73; Gilliland, 391 S.E.2d at 581; see Formento, 744
P.2d at 26 (stating as a "well-settled" rule that "a party 'can not free himself
from fraud by incorporating [an integration clause] in a contract' ") (quoting
Lusk Corp. v. Burgess, 333 P.2d 493, 495 (Ariz. 1958)).
61. Illinois courts have interpreted § 552 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts extremely narrowly. They have refused to expand the language "a
transaction in which [defendant] has a pecuniary interest" beyond the scope of
those who are in the business of supplying information upon which others rely
in making business decisions. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435
N.E.2d 443, 452 (Ill. 1982); see also Hill, supra note 44, at 685-86 (distinguishing
between "antagonistic," or arm's length transactions in which the parties' in-
terest are contrary to one another, and informational transactions in which the
contractual relationship between the parties involves the exchange of informa-
tion for value received).
Courts and legislatures also distinguish between "consumer" transactions
and "commercial" transactions. In a consumer transaction, the buyer is an in-
dividual who purchases the goods for personal, family, or household purposes.
A commercial transaction, on the other hand, involves a sale of goods between
two business entities for purposes that relate to a business opportunity. UNIF.
CONSUMER SALES PRACTCES ACT § 2(1) (1985).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
never lie for statements made in arm's length transactions, 62
subsequent case law has qualified that position. No duty exists
unless there is privity of contract or another sufficiently close
nexus between the parties. 63 Illinois, focussing on the origins of
the negligent misrepresentation action, does not extend the
scope of the action beyond its historical parameters, excluding
parties involved in arm's length negotiations.64 In contrast,
Wisconsin courts have taken an expansive view of the speaker's
duty of care, holding that a party need not be in privity with
the plaintiff to be liable for negligent misrepresentation.65
Third, courts have turned to the policy of freedom of con-
tract to resolve the conflict between a disclaimer clause and a
62. Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 439 A.2d 534, 539 n.7 (Md. 1982).
But see Susan F. Martielli, Comment, Martens Chevrolet v. Seney-Extending
the Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation, 42 MD. L. REV. 596, 603 (1983) (criti-
cizing the court for making the tort available to a buyer in a commercial set-
ting because "[i]n an adversarial business deal, the buyer cannot expect that
the seller has taken care to state each fact correctly for the buyer's benefit").
63. Weisman v. Connors, 540 A.2d 783, 792-94 (Md. Ct. App. 1988), cert de-
nied, 551 A.2d 868 (Md. 1989). The federal courts, applying Maryland law,
have discussed this position further. 21st Century Properties Co. v. Carpenter
Insulation and Carpeting Co., 694 F. Supp. 148, 154 (D. Md. 1988) ("While such
[precontractual] negotiations may be sufficient to establish an intimate nexus
if they invoke considerations of personal trust and reliance, the arm's length
negotiations between representatives of business entities concerning a con-
struction project cannot be said to be 'intimate' unless language is to be
stripped of all meaning." (citation omitted)). "[A] claim for negligent misrep-
resentation is improper when ... the only relationship between the parties is
contractual, both parties are equally sophisticated, and the contract does not
create an express duty of due care in making representations." Martin Mari-
etta Corp. v. Intelstat, 763 F. Supp. 1327, 1332-33 (D. Md. 1991) (citing Flow In-
dus., Inc. v. Fields Constr. Co., 683 F. Supp. 527, 530 (D. Md. 1988)).
64. In Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., the Illinois Supreme
Court held that, because contract principles are sufficient to govern the rela-
tionship between suppliers and purchasers, purely economic loss cannot be re-
covered in tort. 435 N.E.2d 443, 450 (Ill. 1982). The court did, however, carve
out two exceptions to this rule. It allowed recovery of economic losses in
fraudulent misrepresentation actions generally and in negligent misrepresen-
tation actions if and only if the defendant is in the business of supplying infor-
mation to guide others in their business transactions. Id. at 452. Illinois courts
have subsequently construed the negligent misrepresentation exception very
narrowly, consistent with the spirit of Moorman. See, e.g., Black, Johnson &
Simmons Ins. Brokerage, Inc. v. IBM, 440 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
(holding that IBM, which sold merchandise to plaintiffs, did not owe them a
duty of care because it was not "in the business of supplying information").
65. "A defendant's duty is established when it can be said that it was fore-
seeable that his act or omission to act may cause harm to someone."
D'Huyvetter v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., 475 N.W.2d 587, 596 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1991) (quoting A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d
764, 766 (Wis. 1974)).
1204 [Vol. 76:1189
TORT VERSUS CONTRACT
claim of misrepresentation. In the Tenth Circuit, this line of
reasoning developed from the New Mexico Supreme Court's
decision in Rio Grande Jewelers Supply, Inc. v. Data General
Corp.,6 6 in which a commercial purchaser of a computer system
sued the seller for precontractual misrepresentations regarding
the system's capacity to perform specific functions.6 7 The court
held that the action for negligent misrepresentation directly
conflicted with New Mexico's version of section 2-316 of the
UCC and the policy favoring freedom of contract.68 Although
the court in Rio Grande focussed on the UCC issue, and dealt
with the freedom of contract argument only in passing,69 two
months later, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit fully
developed the freedom of contract analysis in Isler v. Texas Oil
& Gas Corp.70
The court in Isler held that the contract precluded any ex-
traneous tort duty.71 The court based its reasoning primarily
on two factors: the importance of safeguarding the consensual
nature of contract, with its bargained-for duties and liabilities,72
and the distinction between contractual and tort obligations.
73
66. 689 P.2d 1269 (N.M. 1984) (answering a question certified from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit).
67. Id at 1270. The sales contract contained a boldface provision disclaim-
ing all prior representations and all warranties, express or implied, not con-
tained in the contract. I&
68. Id.
69. See id. at 1271 (citing Smith v. Price's Creameries, 650 P.2d 825 (N.M.
1982)).
70. 749 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1984). Isler was not a negligent misrepresenta-
tion case. It involved a suit against the owner of a lease by a sublessee alleging
negligent failure to pay rent. Id- at 22. The sublease expressly stated that de-
fendant corporation had no responsibility to plaintiff if it did not make the
rental payments, although it promised to use its best efforts to do so. I&
71. I& at 24. A number of courts in the Tenth Circuit have subsequently
cited Isler as support for their dismissals of negligent misrepresentation ac-
tions that contradict contractual terms. See Mid Continent Cabinetry v. Koch
Sons, No. 87-1248-C, 1991 WL 177961, at *3-4 (D. Kan. Aug. 9, 1991); Ritchie
Enters. v. Honeywell Bull, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1041, 1051 (D. Kan. 1990); United
States Welding, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 640 F. Supp. 350, 351 (D. Colo. 1985);
cf. Keller v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 819 P.2d 69, 75-76 (Colo. 1991)
(en banc) (Rovira, C.J., dissenting).
72. "Important to the vitality of contract is the capacity voluntarily to de-
fine the consequences of the breach of a duty before assuming the duty." Isler,
749 F.2d at 23.
73. Tort law proceeds from a long historical evolution of externally
imposed duties and liabilities. Contract law proceeds from an even
longer historical evolution of bargained-for duties and liabilities. The
careless and unnecessary blanket confusion of tort and contract would
undermine the carefully evolved utility of both.
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This second factor also underlies the "economic loss doctrine,"
a judicial policy denying recovery in tort for economic harm
(lost profits, cost of replacement or repair, etc.) arising from a
contractual transaction.74
Courts have attributed to these three principles varying de-
grees of significance, creating a variety of analyses for deter-
mining whether a frustrated buyer can maintain a tort action
for misrepresentation. Thus, the buyer's success depends on
the jurisdiction in which she brings suit. The federal courts add
a further layer of confusion through their efforts to reconcile
and explain the state law they must apply. The cases discussed
above demonstrate the need for a unified approach to this
conflict.
III. A FLAWED APPROACH: MAINTAINING THE
MISREPRESENTATION ACTION
The three approaches discussed in the previous section all
hinge upon the court's perception of the importance of the con-
tractual nexus between the parties. Courts holding that no
duty exists between commercial parties,75 or that the contract
law barriers to a suit cannot be circumvented, 76 or that the abil-
ity of parties to bargain for their obligations should be para-
mount,"7 have emphasized that the relationship between the
parties is contractual.78 Courts willing to maintain the negli-
74. Seely v. White Motor Co. is the paradigmatic case on the "economic
loss doctrine":
A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer
with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on
the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the
product will not match his economic expectations unless the manufac-
turer agrees that it will.
403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965) (Traynor, J.); accord Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Na-
tional Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 451 (Ill. 1982); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v.
Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986); Northridge Co. v. W.B. Grace & Co., 471
N.W.2d 179, 180 (Wis. 1991); cf Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 687-88
(Minn. 1990) (narrowing the doctrine by holding that the UCC exclusively
controls property damages in commercial, as opposed to consumer,
transactions).
75. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
78. See Isler v. Texas Oil & Gas Co., 749 F.2d 22, 23 (10th Cir. 1990); Mar-
tin Marietta Corp. v. Intelsat, 763 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (D. Md. 1991); Kalil Bot-
tling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 619 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
The contractual nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and de-
fendant is not at issue when a court addresses a suit for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation. Fraud implies dishonesty in fact, affirmatively representing as true
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gent misrepresentation action have downplayed the contractual
nature of the relationship. 79 This latter position, however, is
misguided. A potential buyer and seller, negotiating to form a
contract, are protected by contract law principles such as un-
conscionability, duress and mistake. The real issue, therefore,
is whether tort law should be available as an additional means
of policing the contract.
A. A THREAT TO THE CERTAINTY OF THE CONTRACT
An important function of contract law is the protection of
individuals and courts from manufactured evidence and insuffi-
cient proof.80 This concern for evidentiary security underlies
the parol evidence rule,"' the Statute of Frauds, 2 and the
"plain meaning" rule of contractual interpretation.83 A misrep-
resentation action, however, undermines the evidentiary func-
tion of contract by allowing the plaintiff to introduce extrinsic
evidence of prior oral representations that contract law has
deemed unreliable. When the court admits and considers such
evidence, it varies the contract.
An action in tort, by avoiding the evidentiary safeguards of
contract law, leaves the terms of the contract open to the threat
of fabricated evidence. Contract law has a utilitarian and a lib-
ertarian dimension; both are diminished by the conflation of
that which is known not to be true. A party acting in bad faith cannot consent
to the terms of the contract because there is no "meeting of the minds."
FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 4.10, at 235. Therefore, no contract exists; the
relationship between the parties is not based on a contract. Liability for negli-
gent misrepresentation, on the other hand, does not involve bad faith; a party
may honestly believe that what he says is true but has negligently acquired or
communicated the information. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
79. D'Huyvetter v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., 475 N.W.2d 587, 596
(Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
80. See, eg., Arthur T. von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Considera-
tion: an Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1009, 1016-17
(1959).
81. See U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 2 (1990) (stating that by its provisions on parol
evidence Article Two protects the seller against false allegations of oral
warranties).
82. Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663, 1668-70 (K.B. 1765) (Mansfield,
L.J.) (discussing the rationale underlying the Statute of Frauds).
83. The "plain meaning" rule allows a court to exclude extrinsic evidence
if it has concluded that "the contract language is so clear that extrinsic evi-
dence is not needed to determine the intentions of the parties." HILLMAN ET
AL., supra note 54, 3.07[1]. Given the inherent ambiguity of words, however,
and the infrequency with which "easy cases" involving clear language appear,
this approach is not preferred. Id
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tort and contract theories.84 Tort law injects uncertainty into
contract law which impairs its ability to serve as a vehicle for
risk allocation.
Although the law generally views disclaimers of liability
with mistrust, it tolerates them when it is unclear whether a
rigid rule allocating loss is good.85 Therefore, parties may opt
out of an obligation by choosing an alternative. Yet, the rule of
tort liability for misrepresentation threatens to swallow one of
the primary functions of contract law by imposing a duty that is
not clearly necessary. The common law of nonfraudulent mis-
representation is too blunt an instrument for policing precon-
tractual negotiations.
B. STATUTORY PREEMPTION OF THE TORT CLAIM
The Uniform Commercial Code dictates a resolution to the
tension between a tort claim of misrepresentation and the right
of the seller to disclaim warranties. Section 1-103 states that
the law of misrepresentation shall supplement the provisions of
the Code unless displaced by a particular provision of the
Code.8 6 Most of the courts that have adjudicated a tort claim
for the seller's nonfraudulent misrepresentations have not ad-
dressed the relationship between the Code and tort law. Those
few courts that have, however, have held that the legislature
has spoken, by adopting the Uniform Commercial Code, regard-
ing recovery for economic injury in a purely contractual rela-
tionship.8 7 In Rio Grande Jewelers Supply, Inc. v. Data General
Corp.,88 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that an action for
negligent misrepresentation conflicted directly with that state's
version of section 2-316, governing disclaimers of warranties.
8 9
84. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 22. Contract law serves the utilitarian
function of providing the most efficient means to allocate loss, allowing the
market forces to shape the contours of the individual contract. Contract law is
also highly libertarian, allowing the parties to shape their contract to their in-
dividual needs.
85. Gergen, supra note 52, at 25.
86. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1989).
87. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Intelsat, 763 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (D. Md.
1991) (citing East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 871-
72 (1986) (holding that when a state legislature has adopted the UCC, the Code
controls with regard to the recovery of economic damages in a contractual re-
lationship)); cf. Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn. 1990)
(holding that the UCC controls exclusively concerning damages in a commer-
cial transaction that involves only property damage).
88. 689 P.2d 1269 (N.M. 1984).
89. I& at 1270. The plaintiffs here were hoist by their own petard since
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New Mexico's Commercial Code therefore precluded a claim of
negligent misrepresentation in suits over the sale of goods
under the Code.90
Although courts generally hold that statutes should not be
read in derogation of the common law,91 when a statutory pur-
pose to the contrary is evident, the presumption favoring reten-
tion of long-establishied common law principles must yield.92
In this instance, the legislatures that have adopted section 1-103
of the Uniform Commercial Code have manifested their intent
that provisions of the Code 'displace common law actions, in-
cluding negligent misrepresentation. Therefore, the UCC pro-
visions relating to warranties should control.
This does not mean, however, that there is no need to po-
lice the creation and use of disclaimer clauses. The dissent in
Rio Grande Jewelers was properly concerned about the prob-
lem of unconscionable conduct on the part of the seller.93 This
Note proposes that that problem should and can be addressed
within the law of sales.
IV. MODYFYING THE LAW OF SALES TO ADDRESS
THE PROBLEM OF NONFRAUDULENT
PRECONTRACTUAL
MISREPRESENTATION
If a buyer can no longer maintain a tort action based on the
seller's nonfraudulent misrepresentations, he or she must turn
to contract law for a remedy.94 Applying the parol evidence
they cited UCC § 1-103 as a justification for letting in parol evidence of the
prior misrepresentations. Id
90. Id at 1271.
91. "No statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther
than its words import. It is not to be construed as making any innovation
upon the common law which it does not fairly express." Shaw v. R.R., 101
U.S. 557, 565 (1879).
92. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
93. The majority opinion condones the unconscionable conduct of al-
lowing statements, promises or inferences to be made that lead the
purchaser to believe that a product will do certain things that it can-
not without having to be concerned about their inaccuracy as long as
the written contract contains the usual "boiler plate" language that
"no warranties except those contained in the printed contract are
granted."
Rio Grande Jewelers, 689 P.2d at 1271 (Riordan, J., dissenting).
94. Contract law allows the plaintiff to rescind or reform a contract on
the basis of a negligently made misrepresentation of a material fact. See supra
note 20 and accompanying text. A buyer can also recover monetary damages
for misrepresentations by means of a breach of express warranty suit. See
supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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rule, courts will find that a valid disclaimer of warranties
clause bars the buyer's recovery of economic losses in a breach
of warranty action.95 The buyer must therefore attack the dis-
claimer clause with the only contract law weapon left: the doc-
trine of unconscionability. Courts are reluctant, however, to
find unconscionable that which the UCC explicitly allows.
96
Furthermore, unconscionability is not a very satisfying tool for
policing warranty disclaimers. It is a vague doctrine that courts
use in a conclusory manner,97 and thus lacks the necessary pre-
dictability to safeguard the finality of contracts.
Under the present law of sales, the buyer has no good rem-
edy if he or she has signed a contract on the basis of precon-
tractual representations that turn out to be wrong. This
situation gives the seller tremendous capacity for overreaching.
As one commentator observed:
Because of the bargaining position of well-leveraged sellers, it is not
unusual to encounter attempts at opportunistic exploitation of the
right to contractually modify remedies and disclaim warranties. If
these attempts by a seller are unchecked, the risk of the goods turn-
ing out to be completely worthless will be shouldered by the buyer
who will be left without effective recourse.
98
The seller thus would be free in precontractual negotiations to
say whatever he or she in good faith believed to be true about
95. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing the parol evi-
dence rule).
96. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Furthermore, as Professor
Leff has noted, § 2-316 on disclaimers of warranties contains no reference to
§ 2-302 on unconscionability, although nine other sections of Article Two make
reference to it. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Em-
peror's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 523 n.140 (1967).
97. As Professor Leff observed of UCC § 2-302: "If reading this section
makes anything clear it is that reading this section alone makes nothing clear
about the meaning of 'unconscionable' except perhaps that it is pejorative."
Leff, supra note 96, at 487. Another commentator, discussing the extreme in-
determinacy inherent in the unconscionability doctrine, noted:
Nowhere in the Code can a definition of the term unconscionable be
found. The only guidance given by the drafters is the statement in
comment 1 to section 2-302 that "[t]he basic test is whether, in the
light of the general commercial background and the commercial
needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-
sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the
time of the making of the contract."
David Frisch, Buyer's Remedies and Warranty Disclaimers: The Case for Mis-
take and the Indeterminacy of Section 1-103, 43 ARK. L. REV. 291, 317 n.101
(1990) (footnotes omitted); cf. Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., 283
N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1979) (stating that a significant factor in determining
whether to "pierce the corporate veil" is whether the corporation is function-
ing as a "mere facade" for individual dealings).
98. Frisch, supra note 97, at 304-05.
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the characteristics or capacity of the subject of the sale, without
regard for its accuracy.99 If the seller is wrong, the disclaimer
of express warranties in the preprinted "boilerplate" of the
form contract would allow him or her to escape all liability.
Investing a disclaimer of express warranties with such
weight is an unwelcome step backwards toward the philosophy
of caveat emptor.10 0 The moral appeal of caveat emptor has
lost much of its force,1' 1 as both the development of an implied
warranty of merchantability 10 2 and the Code's position on mod-
ification and limitation of remedies illustrate.103 Furthermore,
the fast pace of modern business and the standardization of
transactions make it impractical to require the buyer to meet
each statement of the seller with sheer incredulity.10 4 Thus, a
99. If the seller speaks dishonestly (i.e., in bad faith), he or she would be
liable under the existing common law for fraud.
100. Caveat emptor places on the plaintiff a "duty" to protect oneself
through reasonable investigaton and to distrust one's "antagonist" in the nego-
tiation process. When parties are dealing at arm's length, neither party is enti-
tled to rely upon the other's statements, not even on mere assertions of fact.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 108, at 751.
101. Caveat emptor embodies the popular sentiment of the time that "[t]he
law, like heaven, protects only those who protect themselves." Bohlen, suprd
note 42, at 740. Some scholars view caveat emptor as the relic of a bygone era
in commerce that predated the development of "an improved code of conmer-
cial ethics." 1i at 739; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 108, at 751-52.
102. Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in
Good Faith and Freedom of Contract A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV.
401, 441-42 (1964). Kessler and Fine set forth the civil law concept of culpa in
contrahendo as an alternative to the view that parties, when negotiating for a
contract, are dealing at arm's length and owe each other nothing. The authors
contend that the civil law doctrine illustrates a heightened awareness of the
social nature of the institution of contract and of the fact that parties do not
contract in a vacuum. Id. at 407.
103. UCC § 2-719 deals with the contractual modification or limitation of
remedy. The comments state that, while parties are left free to shape their
remedies to their particular requirements,
it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum ade-
quate remedies be available.... where an apparently fair and reason-
able clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to
deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must
give way to the general remedy provisions of this Article.
U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (1990). In discussing the validity of clauses limiting or
excluding consequential damages, the comments provide, however, that "[t]he
seller in all cases is free to disclaim warranties in the manner provided in Sec-
tion 2-316." Id cmt. 3.
104. [With the acceleration of business generally, as well as the stand-
ardization of the various types of transactions, the factors which con-
trol judgment demand more and more certainty and precision in sales
and credit transactions, and therefore ... the risk of misrepresenta-




policy that places the risk on the often less-informed buyer con-
flicts with the realities of modern transactions. The commer-
cial world has outgrown caveat emptor.
Disclaimers of express warranties are problematic because
the buyer is often unable to verify the seller's statements easily
and therefore must rely facially on precontractual representa-
tions. Given the alternative of the anachronistic revival of ca-
veat emptor, this Note proposes that legislatures modify the
law of sales to create a right for the buyer, in certain circum-
stances, to recover for economic losses from precontractual mis-
statements concerning the character or capacity of the goods
sold. The case law that has developed to construe UCC section
2-714 is readily applicable here.10 5 As with most provisions in
Article Two, this right to recover could be waived or modified
by the agreement of the parties, consistent with the UCC's
principle of freedom of contract. However, this Note would
further require that such a waiver or modification be made
knowingly and freely. 0 6 A clause to that effect, bargained for
specifically and separately, is evidence of its voluntary nature.
The deliberative nature of the waiver or modification guaran-
tees that the buyer understands what he or she may be relin-
quishing. Finally, this Note would expressly displace the law of
nonfraudulent misrepresentation in the context of sale of goods
transactions
0 7
Green, supra note 42, at 757. If Professor Green perceived the pace of com-
merce to have been "accelerating" in the 1920s, one can only speculate how he
would view today's business world with its facsimile machines, computers, and
fiberoptic communications.
105. Having returned the issue of precontractual misstatement to the con-
tract fold, the law of warranty (namely UCC § 2-714) supplies the appropriate
remedy. Nothing in this Note's proposal is intended to displace the existing
law of buyer's remedies following a rightful rejection or justifiable revocation
of acceptance. See U.C.C. §§ 2-711 to 2-713 (1990).
This Note takes the position that, pursuant to the "basis of the bargain"
language in § 2-313, the buyer need not show any reliance on the misrepresen-
tation in order to recover under this proposal. See supra note 19 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the reliance requirement and express warranties).
106. The "free and knowing" requirement attempts to ameliorate the dan-
ger that any separately bargained-for waiver or modification clause will even-
tually become part of the preformulated boilerplate. If a party does not freely
and knowingly agree to the contents of such a clause, that clause is unenforce-
able. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990) (unconscionability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRAcTs § 211(3) (1979) ("Where the other party has reason to believe that
the party manifesting ... assent would not do so if he knew that the writing
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.").
107. An alternative remedy suggested to the author is an amendment that
would grant the buyer the express right to bring the appropriate action in tort
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This Note proposes the following amendment of Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), a buyer who does
not customarily purchase the goods that are the subject of the con-
tract in question may bring a breach of warranty action against the
seller, pursuant to Section 2-714, for damages resulting from the
seller's erroneous precontractual representations regarding the na-
ture, characteristics, capacity or uses of the goods being sold.
(2) The buyer may waive or modify the right to recover under
this section only if such waiver or modification is freely and know-
ingly made. A separate, signed clause of the contract, allowing the
buyer to state those representations (if any) regarding the nature,
characteristics, capacity or uses of the goods upon which the buyer is
relying, is not conclusive proof that such a waiver or modification was
free and knowing, but is merely evidence of its nature. Any party at-
tempting to assert such a clause shall bear the burden of alleging and
proving that the party against whom the waiver or modification is in-
yoked has freely and knowingly agreed thereto.
(3) The right of recovery provided by this section expressly dis-
places the buyer's right to bring the appropriate action in tort for a
non-fraudulent misrepresentation.
The proposed statutory cause of action raises two initial
concerns. The first involves the scope of the right: Who should
be considered a "buyer" for the purposes of this act? The sec-
ond involves the impact of the new remedy on the parol evi-
dence rule. A discussion of these issues will fit the statutory
remedy into the larger context of existing law and demonstrate
its harmony.
for nonfraudulent misrepresentation. This Note rejects that alternative for
two reasons. First, incorporating common law misrepresentation into the UCC
injects an unnecessary degree of variation into the Code. Not all jurisdictions
recognize actions in innocent or negligent misrepresentation. The ability of
the buyer to recover, and the scope of that recovery, will therefore vary on the
basis of preexisting case law. A legislature's decision to adopt such an amend-
ment is thus no decision at all, since the scope of the remedy lies in the hands
of the courts. Given the fundamental nature of the problem, uniformity of re-
sult is more important than the expedient of turning to an existing body of
case law.
Furthermore, the breach of warranty action is more true to the contrac-
tual nature of the relationship between buyer and seller. The breach of war-
ranty action allows the buyer to recover the benefit of the bargain she made.
If she made a bad bargain, however, she cannot escape it by suing on the war-
ranty. The tort remedy, concerned with making the buyer whole, provides ex-
actly the opposite result because it contemplates recovery of out-of-pocket
losses. This Note's proposed remedy is intended to modify the seller's bargain-
ing behavior by making inaccurate speech costly, ultimately providing the cas-
ual buyer with a degree of security that she currenty does not enjoy. In light




A. THE BUYER'S REMEDY: WHO IS A "BUYER?"
This proposed statutory cause of action for precontractual
misrepresentation is designed to protect the buyer's ability to
rely upon the seller's factual statements. A buyer should not,
however, be entitled to rely on the accuracy of the seller's
statements in all situations. For example, suppose that a buyer
and seller both customarily deal in widgets. The buyer gener-
ally will have sufficient access to the information necessary to
determine whether the seller's assertions of fact were made
with due care.1 08 If the buyer brought a suit in tort for negli-
gent misrepresentation, the court might find that the seller did
not owe the "sophisticated" buyer a duty of care. 0 9 Similarly,
allowing the widget buyer to recover under the statute upsets
the balance in the bargaining relationship with the seller. The
buyer could blindly rely on the seller's statements and, if the
goods did not conform to the precontractual warranties, invoke
the statutory remedy to escape the consequences of sloppy ne-
gotiations. The buyer who customarily deals in the goods being
sold should not have recourse to the proposed statutory right of
recovery.
Courts often find that consumers are "unsophisticated" and
lack sufficient bargaining power to participate meaningfully in
the process of contract formation. These courts may choose to
avoid the rigid application of contract principles in order to
work justice.110 Particularly when dealing with form contracts,
courts have looked beyond the letter of contract doctrine to
protect important rights of the consumer from the vagaries of
manufacturers."'
108. Cf PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 108, at 752-53 (discussing justi-
fiable reliance on assertions of fact: one factor to be considered is the compar-
ative availability of information for determining whether the statement is one
of fact or opinion.).
109. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
110. I believe that this court should forthrightly hold that the proof of
conditions in parol between parties, either of which do not customa-
rily trade in the market in which the property exchanged is bought
and sold, is governed by the standard of commercial reasonableness,
regardless of assertions as to integration.
Green River Valley Foundation, Inc. v. Foster, 473 P.2d 844, 852 (Wash. 1970)
(Finley, J., concurring).
111. The seminal case on this issue is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). In Henningsen, the plaintiff sought consequential
damages resulting from an accident involving the car he recently purchased
from the dealership. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
disclaimer clause excluded the plaintiff's claim for a breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability. Id- at 95. Noting the unequal bargaining power
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The application of contract principles can be equally harsh
for a buyer who is not a "consumer."1" 2 A bottling plant that
buys a computer system from a major manufacturer 3x is likely
in no better position to judge the accuracy of the seller's repre-
sentations than the individual who buys a personal computer.
The current law of warranty does not take into account the fac-
tual complexity of modern transactions. An informational im-
balance is as problematic as an imbalance in bargaining power;
indeed, it can contribute to a disparity in bargaining power.
"Customary" parties necessarily have an advantage, in both ex-
perience and substantive knowledge, over "casual" parties."-4
Therefore, by incorporating a distinction between "customary"
and "casual" buyers and offering protection to the latter, the
statutory right of recovery will reflect the realities of the
marketplace.
of the parties, the court reasoned that it would be against public policy to al-
low Chrysler to disclaim an implied warranty of merchantability and the obli-
gations arising from it with a form contract that fails adequately to notify the
buyer that he has relinquished the right to recover damages for personal inju-
ries arising from a breach of that warranty. I&L at 92-93.
One final note on Henningsen: the court did not have the benefit of UCC
§ 2-302, which addresses unconscionability, and therefore was forced to con-
front and discuss relevent questions of policy. One commentator has noted
that policy discussions are conspicuously absent in more recent cases in which
the courts have the UCC available to them. Leff, supra note 96, at 558 n.300.
112. Several state legislatures have enacted statutes, sanctioning deceptive
trade practices, that make no distinction between "consumers" and "commer-
cial" buyers. E.g., MiNN. STAT. § 325F.69, subd. 1 (1990):
The act, use, or employment by any person of any fraud, false pre-
tense, false promise, misrepresentation, misleading statement or de-
ceptive practice, with the intent that others rely thereon in
connection with the sale of any merchandise, whether or not any per-
son has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is enjoin-
able as provided herein.
The Minnesota statute does not require the plaintiff actually to have been
damaged. Nor is it limited to cases involving intentional wrongdoing. Minne-
sota courts have held that a negligent or unintentional misrepresentation also
violates the Act. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 474
N.W.2d 605, 612 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Yost v. Millhouse, 373 N.W.2d
826, 831 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)). All of these factors are designed to encourage
buyers to stop the activities covered by the statute by bringing suit. IML (citing
Yost, 373 N.W.2d at 832).
113. See Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 619 P.2d 1055 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1980).
114. Article Two differentiates between "transactions between profession-
als in a given field" (i.e., "merchants") and transactions involving "a casual or
inexperienced seller or buyer." Whereas the former may "require special and
clear rules," such rules may not be appropriate for the latter. U.C.C. § 2-104
cmt. 1 (1990); see also Green River Valley Foundation, Inc. v. Foster, 473 P.2d
844, 853 (Wash. 1970) (Finley, J., concurring).
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B. KNOWING WAIVER OR MODIFICATION OF THE BUYER'S
REMEDY: THE EFFECT ON THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Giving the buyer a statutory right to recover for precon-
tractual misstatements at first appears no different than a tort
action for nonfraudulent misrepresentation. Both the statute
and the tort give effect to precontractual statements that,
under a parol evidence analysis, would be displaced by written
language of disclaimer in the contract. Both approaches con-
ceptually broaden the fraud exception to the parol evidence
rule to include nonfraudulent -misrepresentations.-1 5 The main
advantage of the statute is that, consistent with the principle of
freedom of contract, the right to recover may be waived or
modified on the agreement of the parties. This fact distin-
guishes the effect that the statute has on the parol evidence
rule.
The proposed statutory remedy is analogous to the ap-
proach taken by courts that have finessed contract principles to
avoid harsh results for "unsophisticated" consumers. The parol
evidence rule is among those principles that courts have bent.
The Indiana Court of Appeals, for example, has denied effect to
a written disclaimer of warranties that was "inconsistent" with
a prior oral express warranty.116 Reasoning that the existence
of the precontractual oral warranty indicates that the parties
did not intend the writing to be the final expression of their
agreement, the court refused to apply the parol evidence rule
and admitted evidence of the oral warranty.117 The "pro-con-
sumer" approach of the Indiana courts thus protects buyers
from unbargained-for language of disclaimer.
The proposed statutory right to recover for precontractual
misstatements also addresses the problem of an unbargained-
for disclaimer, but its impact on the parol evidence rule is less
destablizing. A specifically bargained-for waiver or modifica-
115. See Franklin v. White, 493 N.E.2d 161, 164-65 (Ind. 1986) (labelling the
statements "constructive fraud," the court held that, in a suit by purchaser
seeking rescission of the contract, evidence of seller's precontractual misstate-
ments was admissable to show that seller misrepresented a material fact, re-
gardless of whether the seller knew of the statements' falsity).
116. Carpetland U.S.A. v. Payne, 536 N.E.2d 306, 309 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989). The Indiana courts have based this approach on language found in com-
ment 1 to § 2-316. But see Travel Craft, Inc. v. Wilhelm Mende GmbH & Co.,
534 N.E.2d 238, 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that evidence of prior oral
express warranties was not admissable when the commercial parties had spe-
cifically negotiated the warranty language).
117. Carpetland, 536 N.E.2d at 309 n.1.
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tion of the buyer's statutory right is essentially a disclaimer of
express warranties with an enhanced form requirement. The
imposition of a form requirement on a disclaimer is not foreign
to the UCC; section 2-316 demands that valid waivers of implied
warranties be "conspicuous.""" Furthermore, the form re-
quirement for the waiver also supplies ample evidence for de-
termining whether the waiver or modification is "the final
expression of the parties" on the subject of express warranties.
The objective standard of satisfying or not satisfying the form
requirement supples a degree of certainty that the judicial fi-
nessing of concepts such as "constructive fraud" or "finality"
lack.
The requirement that the buyer's waiver or modification be
specifically bargained for also furthers the statute's purpose of
protecting the purchaser's ability to rely on factual statements
made by the seller." 9 By making the process of waiver or mod-
ification deliberative, the buyer has an opportunity to acknowl-
edge consciously those representations that induced him to buy
from the seller. Therefore, the buyer's right to recovery for
precontractual mnisrppresentations, waivable upon negotiation
between the parties, does less violence to the parol evidence
rule than does maintaining an action in tort or allowing courts
to bend a substantive rule of contract law, while addressing the
same issues of public policy.
CONCLUSION
This Note contends that parties to a contract for the sale of
118. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1990). In addition to being conspicuous, the lan-
guage disclaiming the implied warranty of mechantability must mention
merchantability. U.C.C. § 2-314. To exclude the implied warranty of fitness,
U.C.C. § 2-315, the disclaimer must be in writing. U.C.C. § 2-316 cmts. 3, 4.
119. This Note proposes a more flexible position than that taken by Texas,
which bars as a matter of course any waiver of a consumer's right to recover
under that state's Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act:
(a) Any waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this subchapter is
contrary to public policy and is unenforceable and void; provided,
however, that a waiver is valid and enforceable if a defendant in an
action or claim under this subchapter pleads and proves;
(1) the consumer is not in a significantly disparate bargaining po-
sition;
(2) the consumer is represented by legal counsel in seeking or ac-
quiring goods or services... by a purchase or a lease for a considera-
tion paid or to be paid that exceeds $500,000; and
(3) the consumer waives all or part of this subchapter.., by an
express provision in a written contract signed by both the consumer
and the consumer's legal counsel ....
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (West 1991).
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goods should not be allowed to bypass contract law by bringing
a tort action on the same facts. Allowing a suit for nonfraudu-
lent misrepresentation threatens the certainty of contracts, and
violates an explicit provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.
This Note balances the need to police the process of contract
formation with the principle of freedom of contract through a
two-part analysis. Those buyers whom the courts find are "cas-
ual" buyers should be allowed to introduce evidence of precon-
tractual misrepresentations. Courts should then examine the
contract to determine the content of any waiver or modification
clause. The party asserting the clause has the burden of prov-
ing that the other party freely and knowingly agreed to its con-
tents. Only if this burden is met should courts apply the parol
evidence rule and exclude evidence of the precontractual
representation.
